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use#LAAPRICE DISCRIMINATION, COPYRIGHT LAW, AND
TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION: EVIDENCE FROM THE
INTRODUCTION OF DVDS*
JULIE HOLLAND MORTIMER
U. S. copyright law effectively prevents direct price discrimination for copy-
right holders that sell to different markets. In response, these ﬁrms can engage in
indirect price discrimination. I derive theoretical predictions about the use of
indirect price discrimination, and I analyze how optimal pricing strategies differ
for different products. Using data on VHS and DVD movie distribution, I ﬁnd that
ﬁrms’ pricing choices are consistent with the predictions of theory and that ﬁrms’
use of indirect price discrimination beneﬁts consumers (but harms ancillary
retailers). Finally, I examine what optimal pricing strategies might look like in a
legal environment that permits direct price discrimination.
I. INTRODUCTION
The effects of intellectual property protection depend on how
ﬁrms respond to the legal environment created by intellectual
property laws. An important aspect of intellectual property law in
the United States is a restriction that copyright law places on
ﬁrms’ abilities to directly price discriminate based on a consum-
er’s intended use of a product. Firms may attempt to mitigate the
effect of this restriction through legal indirect price discrimina-
tion.
1 To identify factors inﬂuencing ﬁrms’ optimal pricing deci-
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Mortimer, Ariel Pakes, Brian Viard, Paul Walsh, Mike Whinston, and four anon-
ymous referees for helpful discussions and comments. I also thank seminar
participants at the Bureau of Economic Analysis, Columbia University, Duke
University, Harvard University, Indiana University, Johns Hopkins University,
MIT, Northwestern University, the National Bureau of Economic Research Sum-
mer Institute, the Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics, University of
Pittsburgh, University of Toronto, University of Virginia, University of Wiscon-
sin-Madison, Yale University, and the 2002 Workshop for Business and Econom-
ics Scholars at Florida Atlantic University for helpful comments. Chris Conlon
provided excellent research assistance. The data for this study were generously
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1. Indirect price discrimination is also known as second-degree price discrim-
ination or nonlinear pricing; buyers self-select across different prices from a menu
(e.g., quantity discounts). Direct price discrimination is also known as third-
degree price discrimination; buyers are assigned to different price offers by the
seller based on their type (e.g., student discounts).
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1307sions under current U. S. copyright law, I empirically examine
the outcomes of two pricing strategies (no price discrimination
and indirect price discrimination) used by ﬁrms for products that
are identical in content but distributed via an old established
technology and a new emerging technology. The analysis uses a
new dataset covering the distribution of movies on VHS and DVD
formats to explain when different pricing strategies may be opti-
mal, and to establish the welfare effects of price discrimination.
Under U. S. copyright law, copyright holders are granted the
exclusive right to reproduce and sell their copyrighted good, as
well as the right to control public displays of the good. Once the
copyrighted good has been sold to a buyer, however, the copyright
holder no longer has jurisdiction over subsequent (private) use of
the product.
2 This restriction over subsequent use is commonly
referred to as the “First Sale Doctrine” and applies to all copy-
right-protected products. This aspect of U. S. copyright law differs
signiﬁcantly from copyright law in other parts of the world, which
usually grants explicit jurisdiction over subsequent uses, such as
rentals. The First Sale Doctrine is commonly cited as providing
the legal basis for such markets as video rentals, used sales of
books and records, and resales of paintings.
3 In the home video
market, the First Sale Doctrine effectively strips movie studios of
the ability to directly price discriminate between video stores and
individual users because these buyers only differ in the extent of
their subsequent use.
In the face of this legal restriction, copyright holders in the
home video industry often use a form of indirect price discrimi-
nation. When releasing a movie on the VHS format, a ﬁrm ini-
tially sets a very high price for the videocassettes (around $100),
during which time the buyers are typically video rental stores
purchasing rental inventory. Subsequently, the ﬁrm lowers the
price substantially (to around $20), at which time the typical
buyers are end-users. This strategy is commonly referred to in the
industry as “rental pricing” and has been used for the vast ma-
2. Speciﬁcally, U. S. copyright law is set forth in the U. S. Copyright Act of
1976. The restriction over subsequent use is the result of a 1984 Supreme Court
case, Universal vs. Sony. Childs [1992] provides details of that case.
3. The First Sale Doctrine is distinct from the better known “Fair Use
Doctrine,” which allows duplication of copyrighted materials for the purpose of
“fair” use (such as photocopying articles for personal use). It is still an open
question as to how the First Sale Doctrine will be interpreted with respect to
digital media where transferring ownership or allowing others to “rent” a legally-
purchased copy generally requires duplication of the original.
1308 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSjority of titles on the VHS format historically. For the remaining
titles, the initial rental window is forgone in favor of generating
early (and potentially more) direct sales to consumers. For these
titles, studios set a retail price in the range of $19.99–$26.99
immediately upon the ﬁrst release. This practice, referred to as
“sell-through pricing,” is typically used for children’s titles and
occasionally for popular blockbuster titles or movies with teen-
ager appeal. Examples of sell-through priced movies include Antz,
Titanic, and Blair Witch Project.
With the introduction of the DVD format, studios have al-
most exclusively adopted sell-through pricing, even as they main-
tain a rental-pricing strategy for the same-day release of the
movie’s VHS format. For example, The Green Mile was initially
released with a VHS price of $107.95 and a same-day DVD price
of $24.95. There are at least two possible explanations for this
dramatic change in the pricing policy of the new format. On one
hand, differences in the populations of consumers that adopt the
DVD format in early years may lead to different optimal pricing
choices. As late adopters enter the market, ﬁrms might again
choose to adopt a rental pricing strategy to discriminate between
the institutional and individual purchasers. On the other hand,
the DVD format may be inherently different from the VHS for-
mat, allowing for convenient access to movies on laptop comput-
ers and additional viewing features. These new uses potentially
affect the relative quality of owning and renting and may lead to
different optimal pricing choices. In this case, one would expect
that sell-through pricing will remain the standard for pricing in
the DVD market.
4 The goal of this paper is to understand what
factors inﬂuence a studio’s choice of sell-through and rental pric-
ing strategies and why the choice of pricing strategy may differ
for the same movie on different formats. I also examine the
welfare effects of price discrimination for ﬁrms and consumers in
the context of different legal environments.
Estimation uses a structural model of consumer behavior in
which different uses of a movie (e.g., owning and renting) are mod-
eled as vertically differentiated products in a demand system. I use
4. An alternative explanation may be that piracy is easier on the digital DVD
format, and a sell-through pricing strategy is aimed at discouraging piracy. The
effects of piracy, however, are complicated: they depend on the ﬁrm’s ability to
monitor piracy both by individuals and by video rental stores. While piracy may
be easier with the digital format, monitoring capabilities—especially for video
rental stores—have also improved dramatically in recent years.
1309 PRICE DISCRIMINATION, COPYRIGHT LAW, AND INNOVATIONa new dataset on weekly rentals and sales at over 2,000 video stores
across the United States to estimate the demand parameters. The
identiﬁcation approach takes advantage of the large number of local
markets in the dataset to allow for several free demand intercepts on
each movie—one parameter for each use and format of each movie
title. I instrument for rental price using a jackknifed estimate of a
store’s rental costs on other similar movies. The economic rationale
for this strategy is that some stores use more inventory than others
to satisfy a given level of demand, thus incurring higher costs. I ﬁnd
that the decision to price discriminate depends on the expected costs
and beneﬁts of doing so and that both demographic and technolog-
ical differences matter for determining the new pricing of the DVD
format. I also estimate that indirect price discrimination beneﬁts
copyright holders, and that consumer welfare is highest under the
price discrimination strategies that are in use.
Other industries face similar challenges when pricing
products. For example, book publishers price discriminate by
sequentially releasing hardcover and paperback versions of a
book. Markets for journal subscriptions, televised sporting
events, live performances, and television shows all face similar
challenges when pricing their products, and copyright holders
in these markets employ a range of techniques to price discrim-
inate among different types of consumers.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section II discusses related
literature and describes the home video industry. In Section III,
I describe the dataset and the timing of rentals and sales. Section
IV lays out a demand system for rentals and purchases of a movie
on a particular format and describes the ﬁrm’s choice of whether
or not to price discriminate. Section V modiﬁes the demand sys-
tem to incorporate institutional details, describes the estimation
strategy, and discusses results. Finally, Section VI provides the
results of welfare analyses.
II. RELATED LITERATURE AND THE HOME VIDEO INDUSTRY
II.A. Related Literature
A growing empirical literature addresses the topic of price
discrimination, and a large literature addresses the theoretical
implications of copyright provisions. However, to my knowledge,
little empirical or theoretical literature addresses the implica-
tions of copyright law through its inﬂuence on price discrimina-
1310 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICStion strategies or other static best responses in markets for copy-
righted goods. A related previous study on price discrimination is
Leslie [2004], which examines the welfare effects of both second-
and third-degree price discrimination in Broadway theater.
5 Oth-
ers have empirically studied the effects of price discrimination in
the presence of competition.
6 Also related to this study, Clerides
[2002] examines the implementation of intertemporal price dis-
crimination in book sales, and Bergstrom [2001] examines insti-
tutional pricing of academic journals.
7
In the home video industry, a strategy of no price discrimi-
nation can be more proﬁtable than a strategy of indirect price
discrimination because there is a cost to implementing indirect
price discrimination (i.e., ﬁrms must reduce product quality by
delaying the sell-through release to consumers). This is similar to
treatments in the theoretical literature in which ﬁrms destroy
quality to better sort consumers.
8
The effects of intellectual property protection have been stud-
ied in other contexts, often focusing on the optimal theoretical
level of copyright protection for the purpose of inducing invest-
ment in creative works,
9 or the theoretical effects of piracy or
unauthorized copying on ﬁrm proﬁts and social welfare.
10 The
most closely related previous paper is Liebowitz [1986], which
studies the impact of price discrimination by journal publishers
on the working of copyright law. The treatment is primarily
theoretical, although it reports some basic data on the prevalence
of price discrimination in the market for academic journals and is
based on work involving a Betamax court case. A much larger
literature on intellectual property protection has focused on
5. Previous empirical work on price discrimination primarily tested whether
or not different instances of price dispersion had a cost-based explanation or a
price discrimination-based explanation. See Borenstein [1991], Shepard [1991],
Borenstein and Rose [1994], among others. Leslie [2004] makes the point that in
some cases we know that price dispersion is not cost-based. Thus, the question of
interest is quantifying the welfare effects of price discrimination.
6. See McManus [2001], Miravete [2002], and Busse and Rysman [2005].
7. Direct price discrimination is used in the market for academic journals
because libraries make the journals (and thus their content) publicly available.
The “Fair Use Doctrine,” which governs public display, gives ﬁrms jurisdiction
over these uses and allows copyright holders to directly price discriminate on this
basis. In contrast, the content of a movie cannot be publicly accessed by putting a
VHS tape or DVD on a shelf—one must play the content privately at home.
8. Mussa and Rosen [1978] is a seminal contribution; Maskin and Riley
[1984] extend their model, and Deneckere and McAfee [1996] also model damaged
goods.
9. See Novos and Waldman [1984] and Yoon [2002].
10. See Ordover and Willig [1978], Johnson [1985], Liebowitz [1985], and
Takayama [1994 and 1997].
1311 PRICE DISCRIMINATION, COPYRIGHT LAW, AND INNOVATIONpatent, rather than copyright, protection. An exception is Mc-
Calman [2004], which studies the governance structures and
licensing behavior of movie studios across countries with differ-
ent levels of intellectual property rights protection.
11 The role of
purchase and rental markets to segment high- and low-value
consumers has also been studied theoretically by Varian [2000],
and an historical background of the video rental industry is
provided in Roehl and Varian [2001]. Varian [2000] derives con-
ditions under which pricing exclusively for a rental market, or
pricing exclusively for direct sale, will be more proﬁtable for the
owner of an information good.
12
II.B. Industry Background
In 1999, the $16 billion home video industry accounted for 55
percent of studios’ domestic revenues, compared to 22 percent
generated by theatrical revenues and 23 percent from all other
forms of media, such as the sales of pay-per-view, cable, and
broadcast television rights.
13 In the years since 1999, the home
video industry has experienced several changes in composition,
and the size of the industry has grown modestly. DVD revenue
has displaced most VHS revenue, and based on the data and time
period that I study (2000 and 2001), DVD revenue is comprised
more heavily of sales than rentals (compared to the VHS format).
Approximately 20,000 home video retail outlets, plus internet
ﬁrms such as Netﬂix, maintain movie inventories for renting to
consumers. The late 1990s witnessed some net consolidation of
the retail industry, but this consolidation slowed by 2000, and the
number of retail outlets is still close to 20,000 today.
Under indirect price discrimination (i.e., “rental pricing”),
video retailers pay a wholesale price for each prerecorded
videocassette tape of around $60–$70. After an initial period of
rental activity (around ﬁve months), the distributor cuts the
11. Also related, McCalman [2001] studies the welfare effects of harmonizing
patent protection across countries (via the TRIPs agreement of the Uraguay
Round of GATT negotiations) by estimating a structural model of innovation using
a modiﬁed version of the model in Eaton and Kortum [1996].
12. Varian identiﬁes three factors that play a role in determining the more
proﬁtable strategy: transactions costs of renting compared to the marginal cost of
production, the number of times content is viewed, and the ability to use a rental
market to segment high- and low-value consumers. The model I derive is very
similar in spirit—the main difference is that my model also incorporates inter-
temporal segmentation. Thus, the choice becomes whether to price discriminate
indirectly or not.
13. VSDA Annual Report, 1999.
1312 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSwholesale price from $60–$70 to $10–$15, called “sell-through
repricing.” At this time the movie is commonly sold to individ-
ual users. This two-tiered pricing strategy is a form of indirect
price discrimination and helps to distinguish between individ-
uals and institutional buyers (i.e., video stores). Exceptions to
this pricing pattern are titles priced for “sell-through.” In this
case, indirect price discrimination is discarded in favor of an
immediate $10–$15 wholesale price to stimulate early sales to
individual users.
Table I details the use of sell-through pricing for the VHS
and DVD formats. These ﬁgures are compiled from the dataset
described in the next section and include all major titles released
between January 2000 and December 2001. Titles are classiﬁed
as “B” or “A” if they earned $15–40 million or more than $40
million, respectively, in theatrical box-ofﬁce revenue. The inci-
dence of sell-through pricing for all titles released on VHS (shown
TABLE I
INCIDENCE OF SELL-THROUGH PRICING,J ANUARY 2000–DECEMBER 2001
Genre
% sell-through priced Total released
AB A B
Panel A: All A and B titles released on VHS
Action/adventure 22.2 0.0 27 11
Children’s/family 100.0 100.0 13 4
Comedy 29.4 2.7 34 37
Drama 15.8 0.0 19 24
Horror/suspense 0.0 0.0 17 15
Romance 0.0 0.0 4 5
Science-ﬁction 75.0 16.7 4 6
Total 29.7 5.9 118 102
Panel B: All A and B titles released on DVD
Action/adventure 100.0 100.0 27 11
Children’s/family 100.0 100.0 12 2
Comedy 100.0 100.0 27 37
Drama 100.0 96.0 19 25
Horror/suspense 100.0 100.0 13 16
Romance 100.0 100.0 4 5
Science-ﬁction 100.0 100.0 4 7
Total 100.0 99.0 106 103
Tabulations compiled by author using data from Rentrak Corporation on all “A” and “B” titles released
between January 2000 and December 2001. “A” titles grossed at least $40 million in theatrical revenues. “B”
titles grossed $15–40 million in theatrical revenues.
1313 PRICE DISCRIMINATION, COPYRIGHT LAW, AND INNOVATIONin Panel A) is around 19 percent. Children’s and family movies
are always sell-through priced, while romance, suspense, and
drama titles are almost never sell-through priced in the dataset.
Science ﬁction titles are likely to be sell-through priced if the title
has a large theatrical box-ofﬁce. In contrast to this, Panel B
shows the use of sell-through pricing for the same movies under
the DVD format. With the exception of a single B title in the
drama genre, all titles are sell-through priced.
III. DATA
III.A. Primary Data Sources
The primary dataset used for this study is a new dataset of
DVD and VHS rental and sales transactions at video retail stores
provided by Rentrak Corporation.
14 The dataset contains trans-
actions at 4,341 stores from January 2000 through June 2002. I
eliminate 2,128 stores that did not carry most major titles be-
cause they exited the database at an early date or entered the
database at a late date. This leaves 2,213 video retail stores. For
all stores, I observe the zip code location.
The stores in Rentrak’s database are video specialty retail-
ers, but rentals and purchases can be made at other retail outlets.
As I detail in the Data Appendix, about three-quarters of all VHS
and DVD rentals occur at video retail outlets, but a greater
proportion of sales occur through alternative distribution chan-
nels. I use auxiliary phone-survey data on purchases at all outlets
to weight the sample of video retailers appropriately.
For each title released on video between January 2000 and
December 2001, I observe theatrical box-ofﬁce revenues, genre,
and MPAA rating. I do not observe title names. I focus on titles
with theatrical box ofﬁce revenues of at least $55 million to
ensure sufﬁcient coverage of the sales market. I track the rental
and sales activities of each title for at least six months on both
formats. Finally, I limit my attention to titles that are not avail-
able on revenue-sharing contracts. Revenue-sharing contracts
allow retailers to pay a very low per-tape fee (between $3 and $8)
14. Over 10,000 retailers used Rentrak to process data between 1998 and
2001, accounting for over half of all retailers in the industry. Blockbuster Video
and Hollywood Video comprise about 4,000 of these retailers, and I do not observe
their transactions. Blockbuster Video does not release their data, and Hollywood
Video recently settled a lawsuit with Rentrak involving a dispute over data
integrity.
1314 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSin exchange for sharing rental revenue with the movie studio. I
drop these titles because they are never considered for sell-
through pricing and because the payment structure that applies
to retailers is much more complex than the simple linear prices
considered here.
15 This leaves forty-one major titles in the anal-
ysis. An observation is a store-title pair, which is constructed
after summarizing weekly transactions data.
To observe (or at least proxy for) local competitive conditions,
I use Yellow Pages listings for all video retail stores in the United
States, including Blockbuster and Hollywood Video stores, for
2000 through 2002. From these data, I identify the total number
of video retail stores within the same zip code of each observed
store in the Rentrak database. In addition, I utilize data from the
2000 U. S. Census on the demographic characteristics of each zip
code. Demographic data include the number of people, median
income, and marginal distributions of race, education, age, gen-
der, employment, family status, and the level of urbanization in
each zip code. These three data sources (phone book listings,
demographics, and transactions data) are merged by zip code.
To specify the portion of consumers that are active in a
market for either the DVD or VHS format, I use data on monthly
DVD hardware penetration rates for each state. I assume that
after a household has purchased a DVD player, they rent and
purchase newly released titles on the DVD format.
16
Finally, there is substantial variation in the price paid by
consumers, both across stores and across titles within a store.
17
In addition to rental activity, most stores sell used tapes for the
forty-one titles in the analysis and charge different prices. How-
ever, some stores have zero market share for new sales of a title.
18
15. Approximately half of the major studios offer revenue-sharing contracts
at this time. Although I do not observe title or studio names, I do observe that
many of the included titles come from two studios that are fairly large in terms of
releases. The title and studio characteristics look quite representative of other
titles in the database.
16. I thank Pinar Karaca-Mandic for her help in acquiring these data, and
Centris for providing them. I provide additional detail on these in the Data Appendix.
17. I focus on the average price of a store-title pair. Thus, variation across
titles within a store comes from having different prices for different titles at any
point in time as well as from variation in how quickly a title is moved from a
high-price “New Release” section to a low-price “Catalog” section. Price variation
across stores is more extensive than variation within-store. See Mortimer [forth-
coming] for more detail on price variation for a similar dataset.
18. An additional motivation for selecting titles with at least $55 million in
theatrical box-ofﬁce receipts is that there is broad coverage of the titles across
many stores. This is especially important for shares of new sales, which are
underrepresented in my dataset.
1315 PRICE DISCRIMINATION, COPYRIGHT LAW, AND INNOVATIONWhen I observe a zero market share for new sales, I assume the
local price is equal to the suggested retail price (SRP), with the
exception that rental priced VHS titles are assigned the whole-
sale price faced by a retailer before re-pricing, and they are
assigned the repriced SRP after repricing.
III.B. Timing of Rentals and Sales
Table II provides summary statistics from the data on both
the quantity and timing of rentals and sales. For the forty-one
titles used in the analysis, I compute weekly totals of rentals and
sales for each title based on the ﬁrst week it appeared at a store.
Panel A refers to titles with a rental priced VHS release, and
Panel B refers to titles with a sell-through priced VHS release. All
TABLE II
TIMING OF RENTALS AND SALES:C UMULATIVE PERCENTAGES BY MONTH
VHS DVD
Rentals
Used
sales
New
sales Rentals
Used
sales
New
sales
Panel A: Rental priced titles (N  12):
Month 1 39.9 0.3 3.0 44.7 7.7 23.4
Month 2 62.2 1.2 7.5 63.6 20.8 46.1
Month 3 77.2 14.7 11.0 75.1 37.9 66.7
Month 4 83.7 29.6 13.3 80.3 48.3 76.6
Month 5 88.1 44.4 14.7 84.8 56.7 83.2
Month 6 94.7 57.1 37.5 93.3 71.3 90.9
Month 7 100.0 69.6 74.4 100.0 84.2 94.5
Month 8 100.0 79.5 89.4 100.0 91.4 96.2
Months 9 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Panel B: Sell-through priced titles (N  29):
Month 1 44.1 1.8 50.1 44.4 5.9 17.4
Month 2 65.8 15.7 60.3 64.3 20.6 34.3
Month 3 76.9 38.5 65.2 77.7 42.2 61.3
Month 4 85.1 54.1 69.2 83.8 55.7 74.8
Month 5 88.1 65.8 71.4 88.2 67.6 84.2
Month 6 94.7 75.3 90.1 94.7 79.5 91.3
Month 7 100.0 84.6 95.7 100.0 87.3 94.1
Month 8 100.0 92.8 98.2 100.0 93.5 96.4
Months 9 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Tabulations compiled by author using data from Rentrak Corporation for the forty-one titles used in the
analysis, which are released between January 2000 and December 2001. “Month” denotes the number of
months since a title’s release on VHS/DVD. (All included titles are released simultaneously on both formats.)
1316 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICStitles (including those with a rental priced VHS format) are
sell-through priced on the DVD format. Of the forty-one titles,
twelve are rental priced (in the top half) and twenty-nine are
sell-through priced. The left half of the table reports total rentals
and sales, and cumulative monthly rental and sales activity for
the VHS format while DVD results are reported in the right half
of the table.
Columns (1) and (4) provide information on the timing of
rentals for VHS and DVD. Approximately two-thirds of all rentals
occur during the ﬁrst two months for both sets of titles and
formats and at least 85 percent of all rentals occur in the ﬁrst ﬁve
months. Columns (2) and (5) examine used sales. Relatively few
used sales occur during the ﬁrst two months when the rental
market is most active; however, by month ﬁve, roughly half of all
used sales have occurred. Unlike rentals and new sales, the sales
of used tapes are not as clearly delineated by the timing of
purchases, which is similar across the four quadrants of Table II.
Finally, columns (3) and (6) examine the timing of new sales. For
rental priced VHS titles, relatively few sales of new tapes (less
than 15 percent) occur during the ﬁrst ﬁve months. In contrast,
roughly three-fourths of all new sales take place in the ﬁrst ﬁve
months for sell-through priced VHS titles, and this ﬁgure is
nearly 85 percent for DVD titles.
Nominal monthly prices of rentals and sales are shown in
Table III. Rentals of DVDs are slightly more expensive than VHS;
there are no signiﬁcant differences in the price of a rental accord-
ing to whether or not a ﬁlm was rental priced. This is somewhat
surprising: one might expect that lower costs of inventory should
yield lower rental prices to consumers. I say more about this in
the discussion of retailer behavior later in the paper. Prices of
rentals do not change after month 5, because I aggregate rental
transactions that occur after week 21 and report the average
price. Prices of used sales are slightly higher for DVDs, and there
are no signiﬁcant differences between prices of used tapes based
on whether or not rental pricing was used. Prices of used tapes
are fairly constant over time. Average prices of new tapes during
the ﬁrst ﬁve months (before sell-through repricing occurs) range
from $89 to $100. In contrast, prices of new sales in months 6 and
higher average between $18 and $27. For sell-through priced
VHS and all DVDs, prices of new sales after month 5 are very
similar to prices in the ﬁrst ﬁve months, although there is a small
reduction in price over time.
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In this section, I outline a model of consumer demand and
ﬁrm behavior restricted by current copyright law that speciﬁes
the conditions under which indirect price discrimination is a more
proﬁtable pricing strategy than nondiscriminatory pricing. I also
compare these outcomes to the results under an alternative copy-
right law where ﬁrms are able to use direct price discrimination.
The model consists of a demand system for consumers and a
supply decision for the ﬁrm. Consumers consider a single product
that is vertically differentiated according to whether or not the
product is rented or purchased, and the supply decision speciﬁes
the ﬁrm’s proﬁt function and examines the conditions that deter-
mine the optimal pricing strategy. Throughout the model, I ig-
TABLE III
MONTHLY AVERAGE PRICES OF RENTALS AND SALES
VHS DVD
Rentals
Used
sales
New
sales Rentals
Used
sales
New
sales
Panel A: Rental priced titles (N  12):
Month 1 3.00 11.84 97.74 3.04 8.45 16.87
Month 2 3.03 7.81 100.44 3.18 9.10 16.48
Month 3 3.01 7.92 97.65 3.29 8.33 16.53
Month 4 2.97 9.15 88.60 3.28 9.02 16.27
Month 5 3.03 8.44 96.40 3.23 9.28 15.60
Month 6 2.72 7.05 19.23 2.78 9.79 14.85
Month 7 2.72 6.29 18.80 2.78 9.93 14.90
Month 8 2.72 5.72 18.27 2.78 9.18 14.60
Months 9 2.72 5.98 26.68 2.78 9.57 15.47
Panel B: Sell-through priced titles (N  29):
Month 1 3.01 7.79 17.48 3.05 10.40 19.50
Month 2 3.17 7.70 18.85 3.53 11.36 17.08
Month 3 3.18 7.36 20.30 3.67 11.27 15.67
Month 4 3.15 7.11 18.47 3.86 10.96 15.47
Month 5 3.12 7.00 18.34 3.80 10.87 14.60
Month 6 2.74 6.42 13.53 3.09 9.87 13.23
Month 7 2.74 6.41 14.34 3.09 9.87 14.01
Month 8 2.74 6.29 14.24 3.09 9.46 12.54
Months 9 2.74 6.00 15.19 3.09 9.87 11.61
Tabulations compiled by author using data from Rentrak Corporation for the forty-one titles used in the
analysis, which are released between January 2000 and December 2001. “Month” denotes the number of
months since a title’s release on VHS/DVD. (All included titles are released simultaneously on both formats.)
All prices are nominal.
1318 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSnore any active role for retailers or variation in local retail market
structure and focus solely on the decisions taken by the movie
studio (i.e., “the ﬁrm”). I bring these issues back into my welfare
calculations at the end by examining retailer markups, which are
recorded in the data. The goal in this section is to provide intu-
ition in the simplest setting; the goal in the empirical work to
follow is to be as general as possible in specifying the problem.
IV.A. Consumer Demand
Consider a standard model of consumer demand for two
vertically differentiated products, the rental or purchase of a
given movie title on a particular format.
19 For each title, I assume
that the ﬁrm has monopoly ownership.
20 Consumers’ utility func-
tions are speciﬁed by
(1) ui 
i,s  ips if purchase,
i,r  ipr if rent,
0 otherwise.
The parameters i,s and i,r represent the quality to consumer i of
purchasing and renting, respectively; ps and pr denote the prices
for purchasing and renting. The parameter i represents the
consumer’s marginal utility of income and differs across individ-
uals according to their income level and their unobservable will-
ingness to pay for movie quality. Note that the inclusion of un-
observable differences in i can accommodate differences in a
consumer’s opportunity cost of time or any other factor that
affects willingness to pay for movie quality. The quality param-
eters can be interpreted quite generally. For example, suppose
that quality differs across consumer characteristics, so that
(2)
i,s  s  Xi, and
i,rrXi.
There is an average value of owning or renting given by s and r.
Beyond that, consumers differ in their utility from owning or
19. Bresnahan [1987] used a vertically differentiated model to analyze the
automobile industry; Song [2004] is a more recent example in which a vertically
differentiated model is estimated. Much of the notation used here follows that in
Berry [1994].
20. Studios attempt to avoid competing with each others’ titles by choosing
different release dates: the forty-one titles analyzed here are released across 108
weeks to avoid direct competition between titles. The inclusion of competing titles,
although a potentially attractive extension of the model, requires an alternative
set of assumptions about the nature of competition over time as new movies are
released.
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of times a consumer has already seen the movie, her family
status, where she lives, and so on.
21 Utility maximization implies
that consumers for whom i  (r  s)/(pr  ps) will purchase,
those for whom i  i,r/pr will choose the outside good, and the
remaining consumers will rent.
IV.B. The Pricing Decision
The movie studio maximizes
max
	 pr
w,ps
w

  NF ˜  ps
w  c  F ˆ  F ˜  pr
w/  c/
where  ˜  (r  s)/(pr  ps) and  ˆ  i,r/pr and N denotes the
number of consumers. The parameter c denotes production cost,
and ps
w and pr
w represent wholesale price in the sales and rental
market, respectively. The cumulative distribution function of the
underlying consumer preferences i is denoted by F. Assuming
perfect competition in the retail sector and no additional costs,
ps  ps
w. The presence of retailer markups or costs (denoted s)
would lead to ps  ps
w  s. The price of renting a tape is
speciﬁed as pr  pr
w/, which also assumes no retailer costs or
markups, and allows for each tape or DVD to rent out a ﬁxed
number of times . This accounts for the fact that multiple rentals
may be produced from each copy of the movie. The addition of
retailer markups or costs would lead to pr  pr
w/ r.
The presence of  introduces some complications into the
model. Speciﬁcally, one worries that retailers have control over
how intensively they use inventory and can inﬂuence . In fact,
one expects that retailers’ decisions will depend on how the movie
is priced, with more intensive use made of higher-priced tapes.
When considering the pricing decision of the ﬁrm, I assume that
 is ﬁxed and known to the ﬁrm. However, I allow it to differ
according to how tapes are priced to address differences in re-
tailer behavior.
22 The presence of  also leads to the possibility
that rentals are rationed in any particular week. This is an
21. Note that unobserved consumer characteristics are contained in i and
their inclusion in the i,e’s is not separately identiﬁed (i.e., whether you receive
lower unobserved quality from the good or just have a lower willingness to pay for
it is indistinguishable).
22. I assume that there are limits to how intensively retailers can use a tape
or DVD. Speciﬁcally, I rule out the possibility that a retailer can buy one tape to
serve any level of rental demand. Technically, this requires an additional con-
straint, which is that realized sales are given by min (F( ˆ)  F( ˜),   Inventory).
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sumers can return over a period of several months to rent the
movie later if it is stocked out at any particular time.
23 More
generally, retailer behavior (whether through inventory usage ,
or the addition of markups or costs) is important for conducting
counterfactual experiments on the ﬁrm’s pricing decision, and I
return to a more extensive discussion of retailer variables (includ-
ing  and the markups r and s) in the section on counterfactual
policy experiments.
24
Under direct price discrimination, the ﬁrm sets different
prices in the rental and sales markets simultaneously. All rental
stores pay pr
w, all consumers pay ps
w, and rental consumers pay
pr
w/ for a rental. This strategy is not feasible under current U. S.
copyright law because ﬁrms are not allowed to charge different
prices for different uses of the product.
In the absence of price discrimination, the ﬁrm sets a single
wholesale price p
w. The relative price of a sale compared to a
rental is no longer under the control of the ﬁrm because the sales
price is always larger by a factor of . While the no-price-discrim-
ination strategy is consistent with U. S. copyright law and used
for virtually all movies released on the DVD format, the restric-
tion of only being able to set a single price can be costly to the
ﬁrm.
In the absence of direct price discrimination, it may be pos-
sible to discriminate indirectly. In the home video industry, ﬁrms
do this by lowering price about ﬁve months after a title’s initial
video release. In principle, ﬁrms could adjust price at many points
in time. In practice, however, ﬁrms in this industry consistently
chose a single repricing date. Consequently, I assume that ﬁrms
are able to commit to future price paths, and I focus on ﬁrms’
decisions to either price discriminate over two periods or not price
discriminate at all.
Suppose that the value of the good to consumers decays
between the two periods so that the value of purchasing in the
later period is s2  s. This captures the erosion of word-of-
mouth, movie reviews, theatrical advertising, the disutility of
waiting, or other factors that inﬂuence the quality of purchasing
23. For additional robustness tests of alternative modeling choices for the 
variable in the context of revenue-sharing programs, see Mortimer [forthcoming].
24. Estimation uses demand-side conditions only. Thus, none of the supply
conditions discussed here affect the estimation of the quality parameters. They do,
however, impact the results of the counterfactual estimates.
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25 Also, I assume that the rental market is fully
served in period one (i.e., there are no “second-run” video stores
that delay purchasing titles until they have been repriced).
The use of indirect price discrimination introduces a third
product into the choice set so that consumers maximize utility
over
(3) ui 
i,s  ips if purchased in period 1,
i,s2  ips2 if purchased in period 2,
i,r  ipr if rented in period 1, and
0 otherwise,
where ps2 is the price of purchasing in period 2. The ﬁrm has
more control over the relative prices of rentals and sales com-
pared to no price discrimination, but they destroy value to sort
consumers because s2  s.
26
Conditional on the rental technology , the decision to use
indirect price discrimination or no price discrimination should
depend upon (1) the value of the good in the rental market
compared to its value in the sales market and (2) the decay rate
of the quality of owning between the ﬁrst and second periods.
Speciﬁcally, theory gives two predictions.
PREDICTION 1. All else equal, indirect price discrimination be-
comes relatively more attractive as the value of the good in
the rental market increases (i.e., as   r rises).
Intuition. There is a stronger incentive to price discriminate
between institutional and individual buyers as the total value of
the good in the rental market increases. In this case, institutional
buyers are willing to pay more for their rental inventories, so the
beneﬁt of discriminating across types of buyers is higher. Con-
versely, if the value in the rental market is relatively low, the ﬁrm
is more likely to forgo indirect price discrimination and sell di-
rectly to consumers in the ﬁrst period. This could happen if, for
25. The quality decay differs from a discount factor because it does not apply
to price or cost. A more critical assumption is that ﬁrms do not choose the extent
of decay (for example, by engaging in special sales-oriented advertising campaigns
or other initiatives). It is difﬁcult to identify such effects empirically, and I have
no reason to believe that the “choice” of quality decay is a ﬁrst-order decision for
the ﬁrm in this context.
26. In the absence of direct price discrimination, non-discriminatory pricing
is preferred to indirect price discrimination whenever the optimal second-period
price exceeds the optimal ﬁrst-period price because consumers cannot be pre-
vented from purchasing in the ﬁrst period and will indeed choose to do so.
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as for children’s titles).
PREDICTION 2. All else equal, indirect price discrimination be-
comes relatively more attractive as the decay rate falls (i.e.,
as s2 rises).
Intuition. The cost to the ﬁrm of delaying sales falls with the
decay rate. Thus, a higher s2 makes indirect price discrimination
more attractive. Several factors could result in a higher s2 for
one movie versus another: consumers of the movie may be rela-
tively patient, or characteristics of the movie (i.e., “timeless”
appeal) may lead to a slower rate of quality decay.
Both predictions have strong intuition. However, to provide
an example of the ﬁrm’s pricing decision and show that Predic-
tions 1 and 2 hold, one must make assumptions about distribu-
tions and parameter values and numerically simulate the pricing
decision. I have explored a range of reasonable assumptions
through numerical simulation and have generally found support
for both predictions. For example, assuming that  has a Weibull
distribution with parameters (6, 1), retailer markups are
zero (i.e., r  s  0), N  1, c  2, 30, Xi0 for all
i, and s  2, I solve for the optimal pricing strategy over a range
of values for   r (from 5 to 6.67 times s) and s2 (from 0.45 to
0.60 of the value of s). The results support both predictions.
V. ESTIMATION AND RESULTS
In this section, I describe the necessary extensions of the
demand speciﬁcation, distributional assumptions, and sources of
identiﬁcation that are used in estimation. I use only demand-side
moment restrictions for the purpose of estimation; supply-side
restrictions are not used for estimating the parameters of the
demand system. After conﬁrming a reasonable ﬁt of the model’s
parameters, I incorporate supply-side information and provide
additional modeling of the retail sector for estimating welfare
effects in the counterfactual exercises.
V.A. Estimation and Identiﬁcation
In the data, I observe one additional option chosen by con-
sumers: purchase of a used tape (or DVD). Thus, to estimate
demand, I must include the purchase of a used tape or DVD as an
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than a new tape, but higher quality than a rental (for a particular
title and format). Markets are deﬁned as a zip code title format
triple as described in the Data Appendix. I consider two time
periods for rental priced titles: before and after sell-through re-
pricing. Thus, a market includes three (or four) products: the
rental of a title, the purchase of a used tape, and the purchase of
a new tape (both now and—if rental priced—later). Consumers in
a particular zip code choose among these products for either the
VHS or DVD format, depending on which hardware they own.
I specify a Weibull distribution for the parameter , which
captures the marginal utility of income. The Weibull distribution
has parameters (,), such that , 0, and  is speciﬁed as
exp(Z m), where Zm contains a constant term and the log of
median income. Plugging in the functional form of the Weibull
distribution gives the predicted demand for rentals:
(4) qr,m,j  N expexp(Zm)
u,m, j  r,m, j
pu,m, j  pr,m, j

 expexp(Zm)
r,m, j
pr,m, j
,
where the deﬁnition of market size, N, is deﬁned appropriately
according to the Data Appendix. The subscript u denotes pur-
chase of a used tape or DVD. Similar solutions apply for new and
used sales. The subscripts denote variation across use, titles, and
geographic market areas. Thus, r,m,j represents the quality level
of a rental (r) of title j in market m. Furthermore, all quality
levels take a different value for each format. Solving recursively
across all uses of the good, I can rewrite the demand expressions
in terms of the quality parameters. The quality of renting, for
example, is given by
(5) r,m,j  pr,m,jln s0,m, j  expZm
1/,
where s0,m,j denotes the market share of the outside good. In
general, local market shares for the different uses of a title format
are denoted by s,m,j, etc., and are deﬁned as q,m,j/N. Similar
expressions are solved recursively for the local quality of used and
new purchases (u,m,j, s2,m,j, and s,m,j). The quality of a used
tape acts as a baseline category for the utility comparisons across
the other choices, and provides a lower-bound to second-period
sales quality when second-period sales are not observed.
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(6) r,m,j  r,j  Xmj  r,m,j.
The quality of used and new sales are similarly deﬁned. The term
r,j denotes the national average quality of a rental of movie j.
Note that for each movie, there are up to seven free demand
parameters: one each for the national average value of rental,
used, and new purchases (both now and—for rental priced ti-
tles—later) for each of the two formats (DVD and VHS). The
ability to include so many free parameters comes from the large
number of markets and is an attractive feature for estimating
demand when many of a product’s important attributes, such as
the quality of a star’s acting, may be unobservable.
The effects of any observable Xm (i.e., the j’s) are allowed to
differ across both titles and formats, but not across different uses.
This allows for horizontal differentiation across geographic mar-
kets for different movie titles on the basis of observables. For
example, movie j may be more valuable on the DVD format in
market m because it appeals to the demographic characteristics
of the local DVD population. Local demographic shifters (Xm)
include the percent of the area that is suburban, store size, the
percent of families who are married with kids, and the local DVD
penetration rate, which is measured at the state level in each
month. The inclusion of the DVD penetration rate is intended to
proxy for demographic effects that are otherwise difﬁcult to cap-
ture. For example, DVD adoption happens earliest at both high
and low income levels but varies signiﬁcantly across geographic
areas. Finally, ,m,j captures the unobserved quality of a use of
title j in market m. For example, a rental of title j may be more
valuable in market m because of unobservable promotions or
community events.
As usual, one may worry that the unobserved attributes
,m,j may be correlated with the local retail price, p,m,j, and any
such correlation will bias the estimate of . A valid instrument for
price must be uncorrelated with the unobserved attributes of the
good, but still correlated with price. Thus, researchers often use
an instrumental variable that is either correlated with costs, or
correlated with competitive conditions from the supply side.
These measures affect price but are uncorrelated with tastes for
unobserved features of the product. In this case, one would like to
instrument for all three uses of the good: rentals, used sales, and
new sales. However, a cost of the unrestrictive speciﬁcation of the
1325 PRICE DISCRIMINATION, COPYRIGHT LAW, AND INNOVATION parameters is that the only price variation not collinear with
the demand intercepts is variation across stores for the same
movie in the same format and use. Thus, the instruments must
vary across store-title pairs.
One might be tempted to think that a store’s variable cost of
a rental (for a given title and format) is a good instrument for
rental price. This cost may be calculated in the data by dividing
the wholesale price of a tape by the number of rentals per tape for
that store-title pair, where the wholesale price assumes a 40
percent discount off the observed suggested retail price of each
videocassette tape or DVD.
27 Variation in retailers’ average costs
of rentals (for a given title and format) thus arises because of
variation in the number of rentals per tape for a title: some
retailers purchase ten tapes and produce 100 rentals from them,
while others purchase ten tapes and produce 200 rentals from
them. Unfortunately, constructing this variable requires an ex
post measure of rental demand (through division by the quantity
of rentals) and so, by construction, the instrument is correlated
with tastes for unobserved attributes of the local rental use of
that title and are thus invalid.
Alternatively, one can construct an expected average cost of a
rental of a title at a store by essentially jackkniﬁng the cost of
other similarly priced titles on the same format, where “similarly
priced” refers to rental or sell-through pricing. For example, of
the twelve titles released under rental-pricing terms on the VHS
format, the expected average cost of a rental of title 12 at store k
is measured by the average cost of a rental of titles 1–11 at store
k. The expected average cost for title 1 may be constructed in a
similar fashion, averaging over titles 2–12, etc. This measure
captures common cost components that store k faces for rental
priced titles on the VHS format, but preserves the title-level
variation within the store. Essentially, the instrument captures
the retail store’s strategy: high rationing (low quality) or low
rationing (high quality), which is correlated with the price of the
rental but not with unobserved quality of the title.
27. The wholesale discount ﬁgure was obtained through interviews with
studio executives and video retail owners. Other discounts (such as volume dis-
counts, bundling discounts, or other “copy-depth” programs) may also apply. I
assume that retailers pay the usual wholesale price when reselling tapes, but get
a 20 percent discount on rental inventories that are acquired under rental-pricing
contracts. These ﬁgures were derived from consultations with industry executives;
the results are robust to reasonable alternative assumptions on these costs (such
as the removal or extension of the additional 20 percent discount).
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issue of correlation with a title’s own demand that arises from
using actual costs, it still faces important limitations. Principally,
the assumptions needed for validity of this instrument are quite
strong. To be valid, variation in this instrument must be driven
only by cost factors and not by features of local demand that
stores take into account when choosing an inventory policy. For
example, if variation in this instrument is due to retailers’ impa-
tience in servicing demand, the instrument is valid. This could
happen if the costs of shelf space for new releases are higher at
one store than another (e.g., a store holds a larger stock of older
catalog titles). Similarly, if variation in rental turns per tape is
due to differences in management skill or employee organization
(e.g., tapes get lost or broken more often at one store than an-
other), the instrument is also valid. However, if differences in
consumer impatience or other features of demand lead a retailer
to stock higher inventory levels in a store, the instrument is no
longer valid. Although cost-side effects do exist, it seems likely
that demand-side effects also happen in reality, which is prob-
lematic for my instrumental variable strategy. Unfortunately, I
have been unable to identify a better instrument that still allows
for the unrestrictive speciﬁcation of the quality parameters. The
direction of the bias if the instrument is compromised by de-
mand-side effects is that movies with unobservably better
quality are in higher demand, and these store-title pairs also
display a higher price. This leads to an upward bias on the
mean price coefﬁcient, 0.
A second alternative would be to not instrument for rental
price. One might argue that there is sufﬁcient stickiness in price
across titles at a retail location, and that instrumenting for price
is not necessary. In the analysis that follows, I present results
with the instrument for rental price, but not instrumenting yields
results that are qualitatively the same.
28
For used sales, one might consider using the total rental
inventory that the retailer ordered for a title, less one unit. This
is, by deﬁnition, his available supply of the used product. How-
ever, one may worry that u,j,m need not be uncorrelated with
r,j,m, and if they are correlated, the inventory of the title is not
28. The similarity between the OLS and IV results could result from price
stickiness (in which case there is not much need to instrument for price), or from
the fact that the instruments used are compromised by demand-side effects.
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instrument using the expected average inventory of other similar
titles to instrument for the price in the used market.
29
Instrumenting for new sales is more straightforward. The
cost to the retailer of a title depends only on the wholesale price.
Unfortunately, this does not vary across retailers. Therefore, I
interact the wholesale price paid by retailers with their observed
competitive conditions, which includes the number of video stores
in the same zip code.
30 This instrument captures both cost factors
and market conditions and preserves variation across stores for a
given title.
One can now combine (5) and (6) to form moment conditions:
(7) EW,m,j  0
where W includes Zm and the instrumental variables. The pa-
rameters to be estimated are (r,u,s,s2,,). The param-
eters r, u, and s are all vectors of length J (the number of
titles), while s2 has length equal to the number of rental priced
titles. Estimation proceeds using generalized method of mo-
ments, choosing  to minimize
 ˆ  argmin
i
(,Wi)

A
i
(,Wi),
where (,Wi) is the set of moment conditions, i is now used to
denote format-title-use observations, and A is a weight matrix
chosen to minimize variance according to Hansen [1982].
Direct estimation of  ˆ is difﬁcult because of the large number
of demand parameters (258 parameters in the  vectors, plus 328
parameters in the  vector, plus three parameters in the  and 
vectors). However, all of the  and  parameters enter  linearly,
which allows me to simplify the estimation by using a two-step
procedure. I ﬁrst guess values for the  and  vectors, then given
those values, I minimize the objective function (which is nonlin-
ear) over values of  and . Given the new values of  and ,I
construct ﬁtted values of ,m,j’s, which I then regress on title-
29. This instrument is constructed analogously to the expected average cost
in the rental market, using inventory, not average cost.
30. Note that the wholesale price set by the studio only depends on the
national average quality, not local deviations from that. So any unobserved
quality that is accounted for in the wholesale price is picked up by the demand
intercepts s,j.
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 and  vectors. I iterate this procedure until convergence.
As utility functions are ordinal, I need to normalize at least
one of the quality parameters. I normalize the value of the outside
good for movie 1 on the VHS format such that E(Xm1) is equal
to a constant.
31 The remaining  parameters are identiﬁed from
market shares both in levels and in relative terms. Speciﬁcally,
better movies overall have higher market share for all uses, and
movies with higher market share in the sales market relative to
the rental market have a higher sales value. Market shares vary
across movies, formats, and retail store locations for a given price.
The  and  parameters are identiﬁed from (1) the normalization
of the quality of the ﬁrst movie in the ﬁrst market, (2) variation
in income, and (3) variation across geographic markets in the
relative market shares of rentals versus sales (for all movies).
V.B. Estimation Results
Table IV provides estimation results. Panel A reports esti-
mates of the parameters of the model. Rather than report forty-
one sets of quality parameters (one set for each title), I report
means of the parameter estimates and standard errors for each of
the four format-pricing types (i.e., VHS and DVD formats based
on whether the VHS format was rental priced or sell-through
priced). After discussing the means, I provide scatterplots com-
paring the quality parameters for individual movies.
The parameters of the distribution of  indicate that neigh-
borhoods with higher median income are associated with a higher
willingness to pay for movies on tape or DVD (1  0.96). The 
parameters affect the “local quality” or local taste for movies,
across all uses of a title. Larger stores are located in neighbor-
hoods with greater demand for movies regardless of format. (The
average  associated with store size is positive.) A higher propor-
tion of “married with children” households is associated with a
lower demand on the VHS format but with a higher demand on
31. I calculate the value of E(Xm1) by setting 1, computing the
,m,j’s and then regressing ,m,j on use dummies and Xm. The vector 1 from this
regression (i.e., the value of the  vector for title 1 on VHS) was then used to
normalize the outside good in each market for title 1. This was done to preserve
geographic variation in the normalization for title 1. Normalizing the value of 1
to be zero in all geographic markets would be perfectly valid from an econometric
point of view but would give the same value of the outside good for all geographic
markets. My method normalizes 1 to be equal to a vector of nonzero constants
while preserving variation across markets.
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urban areas have relatively lower demand for the DVD format
compared to their nonsuburban counterparts. This effect is often
not statistically signiﬁcantly different from zero for individual
titles. DVD hardware penetration rates are strongly correlated
TABLE IV
ESTIMATION RESULTS
VHS DVD (VHS was:)
Rental
priced
Sell-through
priced
Rental
priced
Sell-through
priced
Panel A: Estimated parameter values
Parameters of the distribution of 
a:
Constant (0) 0.786
(0.054)
Median income (1) 0.958
(0.046)
Shape parameter () 1.814
(0.008)
Average taste parameters (j’s):
Store size 0.244 0.210 0.372 0.293
(0.011) (0.009) (0.016) (0.012)
% married/kids 1.121 0.975 0.879 0.814
(0.333) (0.267) (0.435) (0.354)
% suburban 0.075 0.249 0.304 0.198
(0.137) (0.109) (0.176) (0.143)
% DVD penetration 3.764 1.650 10.492 3.514
(1.037) (0.936) (1.646) (1.199)
E[X] 1.221 0.881 0.962 1.150
Average national quality
parameters (, j’s)
b:
Rental quality (r, j) 0.062 0.348 0.304 0.044
(0.142) (0.112) (0.184) (0.151)
Used quality (u, j) 0.261 0.621 1.016 0.388
(0.142) (0.112) (0.184) (0.151)
Second period quality (s2,j) 0.379 — — —
(0.142)
First period quality (s, j) 0.581 0.819 1.595 0.639
(0.142) (0.112) (0.184) (0.151)
Panel B: Average predicted quality
estimates (,m, j  , j  Xmj)
E(r,m, j) 1.293 1.209 1.267 1.118
E(u,m, j) 1.491 1.481 1.989 1.568
E(s2,m, j) 1.605 — — —
E(s,m, j) 1.802 1.679 2.588 1.831
E(s2,m, j)/E(s,m, j) 0.891 — — —
E(r,m, j)/E(s,m, j) 0.718 0.720 0.490 0.611
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penetration are estimated to have lower demand for the DVD
format per household. This is consistent with an adoption pattern
of DVD hardware in which high-value consumers adopt early so
that as later adopters enter the DVD market (and DVD penetra-
tion increases), the average demand falls.
The  parameters pick up variation in the average national
quality of a title across all markets. As one moves to a more
valuable use of a movie (from rental to buying used, for example),
the quality increases. However, comparisons across the four for-
mat-pricing types need to account for differences in the average
value of Xm ˆ for each title. For this reason, I report the average
predicted quality estimates in Panel B. These estimates add
Xm ˆ to the average national quality parameters for each title,
and make comparisons across the four format-pricing types
meaningful.
The average predicted quality of different uses of a title
across the four format-pricing types in Panel B are given by
TABLE IV
(CONTINUED)
VHS DVD (VHS was:)
Rental
priced
Sell-through
priced
Rental
priced
Sell-through
priced
Panel C: Averages of retail
parameters used in
counterfactuals
Inventory use () 23.74 16.91 15.60 15.31
(13.72) (8.37) (10.66) (10.40)
Rental markup (r) 0.03 1.88 0.90 0.38
(2.09) (0.80) (2.52) (3.57)
Used sale markup (u) 8.45 7.71 10.29 11.57
(1.95) (1.57) (1.53) (2.17)
Sale markup, period 1 (s) 43.60 9.50 8.19 10.61
(1.74) (5.76) (4.13) (3.17)
Sale markup, period 2 (s2) 4.09 — — —
(2.33)
Local Mkt. Size (000s) 5.62 5.49 0.69 0.79
(3.46) (3.41) (0.60) (0.67)
No. Obs. 23,213 58,077 18,041 42,118
Standard errors reported in Panel A; standard deviations reported in Panel C. Standard errors are
corrected for within-title and within-store correlation where appropriate (i.e.,  and ).
a. Parameters of the distribution of  are restricted to be constant across titles.
b. The standard errors on the four usage types are equal because the sum of the squared usage dummies
is the same for all four types (i.e., each usage type has an observation for each title at each store).
1331 PRICE DISCRIMINATION, COPYRIGHT LAW, AND INNOVATION ˆ
o,m,j  ˆ
o,j  Xm ˆ
j. The average predicted quality of a rental is
slightly lower for the DVD format compared to VHS while the
average predicted used and new sale DVD qualities are higher.
There is a larger difference between the average predicted DVD
sales qualities for the two groups of titles (rental versus sell-
through priced) than there is on the VHS format. This is primar-
ily driven by lower average quality estimates for children’s titles
on the DVD format, which drives down the average sales qualities
of DVD titles that were sell-through priced on VHS.
32 The decay
rate for the quality of a purchase is estimated as the ratio of the
average quality of a purchase in the second period and the aver-
age quality of a purchase in the ﬁrst period for rental priced VHS
titles and is 0.89. The relative value of renting versus owning is
higher on the VHS format: I estimate that a consumer receives
over 70 percent of the value of owning a VHS tape from renting it
one time. The comparable ﬁgure for the DVD format is around
50–60 percent.
Panel C of Table IV reports values for the parameters  and
, which are calculated directly from the data. The  parameter is
the ratio of rentals to inventory and differs considerably across
the two pricing regimes. VHS inventory is used more intensively
for titles that are rental priced, producing 23.7 rentals per tape
compared to 16.9 rentals per tape for sell-through priced titles.
DVDs show almost no difference in the rental technology across
the two sets of titles, producing 15.6 and 15.3 rentals, respec-
tively. The  parameter is the difference between the observed
retail price and the observed variable cost of the rental. Retail
markups are higher for the sell-through priced VHS titles and for
DVDs: around $2 compared to $0.03 for rental priced titles on
the VHS format, and between $0.38 and $0.90 for both sets of
titles on the DVD format. Sales markups by retailers are around
$40 in the ﬁrst period for rental priced VHS but are around $4
after repricing. Mark-ups in the ﬁrst period for sell-through
priced VHS and titles on the DVD format range from $8 to $10.
The retailer markup on sales of used tapes is assumed to be equal
to the price.
The quality of a second-period purchase is not identiﬁed
directly for sell-through priced titles, because there are no data on
32. Anecdotally, trade press articles cite the ease of use of the VHS format for
children as one source of this difference because VHS tapes can be inserted into a
machine and automatically played without the need to press any additional
buttons.
1332 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSany actual second-period purchases for those titles. I construct an
estimate of second-period quality for these titles as follows. The
average difference between the ﬁrst-period new purchase quality
and the used purchase quality is estimated for each genre from
the twelve rental priced titles in the top panel.
33 I then calculate
the percentage split represented by the second-period purchase
quality for these titles and apply that percentage to the sell-
through priced titles in the second panel. For example, if rental-
priced dramas have average used, period 2, and period 1 qualities
of 1, 1.5, and 2, respectively, and a sell-through priced drama has
used and period 1 qualities of 2 and 4, then the period 2 quality
assigned to that title is 3.
One downside to estimating second-period quality for sell-
through priced titles in this way is that unobserved differences in
the second-period quality may be the reason that the ﬁrm chose to
do sell-through pricing. In fact, this is predicted by the theoretical
model. Fortunately, it is straightforward to bound this parame-
ter, because the second-period quality is presumably greater than
the used quality (and also less than the period-one new quality).
V.C. Scatterplots of Quality Estimates
Table IV provides the mean quality estimates for each of the
four movie-format groups, but does not show the variation across
titles that the estimates are able to capture through the large
number of free demand intercepts. Figures I and II provide some
insight into the nature of this variation.
The theoretical model makes two predictions for the ﬁrm’s
pricing decision based on the value of the rental and second-
period sales markets: movies with (1) higher value in the rental
market and/or (2) slower decay in the sales market should be
more likely to be rental priced, all else equal. To test these
predictions using my estimates, I need to scale each movie’s
quality parameters by its value in the sales market to make
movies comparable. Thus, I scale each movie’s estimated value in
the rental and second-period sales markets by its value in the
ﬁrst-period sale market.
34
33. For children’s titles, I used PG-rated “family” movies, which are primarily
directed at the children’s market.
34. I also need to map the estimated values into the positive number line, as
the normalization in the demand speciﬁcation is very unrestrictive and only
normalizes the value of the ﬁrst movie in the ﬁrst market. As a result of this
unrestrictive normalization, some movies may have estimated quality parameters
1333 PRICE DISCRIMINATION, COPYRIGHT LAW, AND INNOVATIONFigure I provides a scatterplot of the estimated relative value of
each movie in the rental market on the vertical axis. The estimated
relative value of each movie in the second-period sales market is
plotted on the horizontal axis.
35 I use the lower bound of second-
period quality for the sell-through priced titles, calculated as u,j 
0.0001; using the average estimate of second-period quality instead
of its lower bound gives very similar results. The predictions of the
theoretical model are that rental priced movies should lie in the
northeast part of the plane with sell-through priced movies lying
closer to the origin. Figure I shows that the ﬁrst prediction clearly
holds: movies for which the ﬁrm chose price discrimination are more
valuable in the rental market. The result for the second prediction is
more ambiguous: the theoretical model predicts that the rental
that are negative, making ratios of the qualities difﬁcult to interpret across
movies. I use the exponential function for mapping quality parameters to the
positive number line. This is done only for displaying relative quality estimates
across movies in the scatterplots. Counterfactual estimates use the actual quality
parameters.
35. The exact mappings are   exp(r)/exp(s) for the value in the rental
market, and exp(s2)/exp(s) for the second-period sales market.
FIGURE I
Estimated Quality Parameters, All Titles (uses lower bound of second-period
quality for sell-through priced titles)
1334 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSpriced titles would lie to the right of sell-through priced titles, and
this pattern is weaker in Figure I. However, this prediction should
be more difﬁcult to show in the data because we do not directly
observe second-period sales for sell-through priced titles.
A much clearer picture emerges if one compares the VHS and
DVD formats for the set of movies that were rental priced on
VHS. Figure II displays estimated quality levels for these twelve
movies. Clearly, comparisons across the two formats (when they
are priced differently) match the predictions of the theoretical
model with the VHS format being both (1) relatively more valu-
able in the rental market and (2) relatively more valuable in the
second-period sales market. This separation is not evident when
comparing movies on VHS and DVD formats that were sell-
through priced for both format types.
36
36. Figure II also uses the lower bound of the second-period sales quality
estimates for sell-through priced titles, but the same qualitative patterns emerge
if I use the average estimate of second-period sales quality.
FIGURE II
Estimated Quality Parameters, Titles whose VHS was Rental Priced (uses
lower bound of second-period quality for DVD format)
1335 PRICE DISCRIMINATION, COPYRIGHT LAW, AND INNOVATIONVI. COUNTERFACTUAL EXPERIMENTS AND WELFARE ANALYSIS OF
COPYRIGHT LAW
In addition to analyzing ﬁrms’ pricing decisions, the esti-
mated demand model allows me to examine the welfare implica-
tions of price discrimination under current U. S. copyright law. In
order to do this, I use the estimated parameters in Table IV to
predict market shares, variable proﬁts for studios and retailers,
and consumer surplus, assuming that studios choose the price or
prices that maximize their proﬁt for each title. I then recalculate
market shares, variable proﬁts, and consumer surplus under the
assumption that studios adopt the “other” pricing regime in each
of the four groups of title-format pairs, allowing for the studio’s
optimal price under the alternative regime. That is, I examine the
outcomes if rental priced titles were instead sell-through priced,
and vice versa. This counterfactual yields the welfare implica-
tions of alternative pricing strategies under U. S. copyright law.
As shown earlier, predictions about a ﬁrm’s price discrimi-
nation strategy depend on the estimated beneﬁts and costs of
price discrimination. These beneﬁts and costs depend on a mov-
ie’s value in the rental market and its rate of decay in the sales
market. However, retailer behavior can affect a movie’s value in
the rental market and may depend on the pricing strategy taken
by the ﬁrm. One should take this into account when comparing
the proﬁtability of different pricing strategies. The next subsec-
tion discusses the relevant parameters for modeling the retail
sector. Following that, I provide the results of the welfare
analyses.
VI.A. Additional Modeling for Counterfactual Experiments
There are two choices for how to handle changes in retailer
parameters, which are  and . On one hand, one could write
down a model of retailer competition in which  and  are deter-
mined endogenously. One challenge with this approach is that
many of the observable competitive conditions at the retail level
do not change across pricing types. Alternatively, one could adopt
a less complete model of retailer competition but use the rich
structure of the data to predict changes in  and  empirically
under counterfactual pricing strategies. The beneﬁt of this ap-
proach is that it retains the focus on the pricing decision of the
movie studio and allows for considerable ﬂexibility within the set
of prices that are observed. It also allows for ﬂexibility across
1336 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSretailers that differ according to unobservable characteristics but
have the same observable characteristics. The main drawback to
this approach is that, while it may give quite accurate predictions
about changes in  and  for pricing contracts that are observed,
it is less informative about changes in  and  for prices for which
we have no observations. In other words, out-of-sample predic-
tions are more constrained. I adopt the second method.
For , I assume that each retailer receives the average
markup observed for its “other” priced movies when examining
the effects of the “other” pricing strategy. This is calculated di-
rectly from the data, and I report the average ’s in Table IV. For
retailer k, I use this average markup of rental priced movies for
examining outcomes of a rental pricing strategy for titles that
were actually priced for sell-through, and I use this average
markup of sell-through priced movies for examining outcomes of
a sell-through pricing strategy for titles that were actually rental
priced. An analogous approach identiﬁes markups of sales for
each retailer. In addition to modeling retailer markups, I allow
for a change in each retailer’s intensity of inventory use under the
counterfactual pricing regime due to the difference in the cost of
a tape. In a method analogous to that used for retailer markups,
I use the average of retailer k’s observed inventory usage of rental
priced titles to give counterfactual inventory use for titles that
were actually sell-through priced and vice versa for titles that
were actually rental priced.
37
One limitation to this method is that a higher  does not
directly affect consumer utility. One worries about an effect like
this if, for example, a higher  leads to longer (and less desirable)
wait times for consumers because of rationing. Assuming that
retailers use rental priced tapes more intensively and that con-
sumers do not like waiting, consumer welfare would thus be lower
for rental-pricing regimes. Furthermore, the effect of rationing
may change if the pricing of all titles changed.
38
37. I have also performed a number of robustness tests, such as calculating
the average increase in inventory use for the two pricing regimes and applying
that to each store’s actual  for each title. The average increase is around three
(i.e., stores produce three times as many rentals from each tape for rental priced
titles compared to sell-through priced titles). The results are not affected in any
meaningful way. Alternatively, one could condition on additional variables when
averaging to allow for a smoother mapping over prices. For example, one could
regress  and  on pricing indicators and actual wholesale prices and use the
estimated coefﬁcients to predict the counterfactual ’s and .
38. One could incorporate this type of effect with some additional assump-
tions on the utility functions. For example, one could allow the quality of a rental
1337 PRICE DISCRIMINATION, COPYRIGHT LAW, AND INNOVATIONFinally, the demand for used tapes highlights an important
issue for producers of durable goods. I assume that the market for
used tapes is constrained by the level of inventory purchased by
retailers. Thus, I assume that retailers can only sell used tapes up
to the level of their inventory, less one tape to keep for future
rental business. In many cases, this leads to rationing of used
tapes. This effect is quite interesting, as it highlights the impor-
tance of price discrimination in markets for durable goods where
the ﬁrm does not control the second-hand market.
VI.B. Welfare Analyses
Analyzing the welfare effects of the current pricing strategies
requires a comparison of the current outcomes to those under
alternative pricing regimes. In each case, I assume that the
copyright holder optimally chooses price. The welfare analyses
proceed in two steps. In the ﬁrst step, I calculate optimal prices,
predicted market shares, proﬁts, and consumer surplus under the
current pricing strategy, and I compare this to actual prices,
market shares, and proﬁts. This gives an indication of how well
the demand estimates capture variation in the data. Estimates
that are far from actual may indicate a poor ﬁt of the demand
model. Once a reasonable ﬁt has been conﬁrmed, the predicted
proﬁts and consumer surplus estimates provide a baseline com-
parison for alternative pricing regimes. In the second step, I
calculate optimal prices, market shares, proﬁts, and consumer
surplus under an alternative pricing strategy and compare these
outcomes to the outcomes derived in the ﬁrst step. For example,
for analyzing the effect of rental pricing for the set of titles that
are currently rental priced, I compare the outcomes under rental
pricing to the current predicted outcomes. Recall that only de-
mand-side moment restrictions are used for estimating the qual-
ity and taste parameters, and retailer-speciﬁc averages are used
to estimate parameters for retail markups and inventory use.
Thus, none of the estimated parameters relies on any assump-
tions of proﬁt-maximizing behavior by the copyright holder and it
is possible that either the current pricing policy or the alternative
pricing policy can yield higher predicted proﬁts.
The results of the counterfactual pricing decisions are con-
tained in Tables V and VI. I start with Table V, in which the ﬁrst
to decrease based on the estimated  that is relevant to the pricing counterfactual.
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VHS format. The table is divided into two panels according to
whether or not a title’s VHS release was rental or sell-through
priced. The ﬁrst column lists actual prices, market shares, and
variable proﬁts for movie studios and retailers. The reported
proﬁts are the average variable proﬁts for a title, assuming that
markups and prices in the unobserved stores in each market are
TABLE V
COUNTERFACTUAL EXERCISES, VHS
Actual Current Other Mkt. seg.
Panel A: Rental priced titles (12):
pr
w 52.43 58.07 31.67 38.47
ps (period 1) 109.13 105.13 41.41 38.57
ps (period 2) 20.46 16.97 — —
pu 8.45 8.63 8.48 8.62
pr 2.92 2.84 3.37 2.51
% new (period 1) 0.16 0.24 0.11 0.34
% new (period 2) 0.34 0.97 — —
% used 0.40 0.32 0.52 0.34
% rent 29.35 31.84 25.19 37.98
Avg. studio proﬁt (Mil.) 5.77 5.68 4.86 4.24
Avg. retailer proﬁt (Mil.) 3.01 3.10 3.41 2.40
% studio proﬁt — 1.55 14.45 25.30
% retailer proﬁt — 2.98 10.20 22.44
% consumer surplus — — 21.42 17.77
Panel B: Sell-through priced titles (29):
pr
w 14.49 16.13 32.41 45.44
ps (period 1) 24.00 25.70 76.13 19.49
ps (period 2) — — 20.70 —
pu 7.71 7.72 7.80 7.78
pr 2.94 3.04 1.70 2.45
% new (period 1) 0.86 1.44 0.07 2.60
% new (period 2) — — 1.08 —
% used 0.81 0.48 0.36 0.11
% rent 25.43 24.08 46.65 29.74
Avg. studio proﬁt (Mil.) 3.53 4.70 3.32 4.86
Avg. retailer proﬁt (Mil.) 6.41 6.31 1.99 2.47
% studio proﬁt — 33.09 29.26 3.56
% retailer proﬁt — 1.51 68.40 60.86
% consumer surplus — — 11.15 24.59
Retail and studio proﬁts are weighted to include all outlets.
“Current” uses actual  and .
“Other” uses counterfactual  and .
“Mkt. Seg.” uses r and  from rental pricing; s from sell-through.
1339 PRICE DISCRIMINATION, COPYRIGHT LAW, AND INNOVATIONthe same as the markups and prices I do observe. Actual market
shares are around 25–29 percent for rentals of titles on VHS.
Column (2) solves for the optimal monopoly price, given the
parameter values. In Panel A, covering rental priced VHS titles,
estimated prices, and market shares are quite close to the actual.
In Panel B, covering sell-through priced VHS titles, the optimal
price is estimated to be slightly higher than the actual price, with
TABLE VI
COUNTERFACTUAL EXERCISES, DVD
Actual Current Other Mkt. seg.
Panel A: VHS was rental priced (12):
pr
w 15.55 15.22 32.08 42.09
ps (period 1) 23.75 24.05 75.64 22.49
ps (period 2) — — 21.41 —
pu 10.29 10.29 10.31 10.29
pr 2.81 2.82 1.52 2.14
% new (period 1) 5.66 7.48 0.29 9.71
% new (period 2) — — 2.90 —
% used 0.28 0.05 0.67 0.02
% rent 24.47 26.49 54.16 33.00
Avg. studio proﬁt (Mil.) 0.96 1.15 0.72 1.22
Avg. retailer (Mil.) 0.58 0.63 0.35 0.32
% studio proﬁt — 20.29 37.33 6.25
% retailer proﬁt — 7.39 44.84 49.76
% consumer surplus — — 8.81 29.78
Panel B: VHS was sell-through priced (29):
pr
w 17.16 17.77 36.03 42.83
ps (period 1) 27.77 28.86 79.80 24.03
ps (period 2) — — 23.48 —
pu 11.57 11.39 11.45 11.46
pr 2.81 2.95 1.72 2.31
% new (period 1) 2.62 3.93 0.08 5.35
% new (period 2) — — 2.87 —
% used 0.34 0.24 0.36 0.08
% rent 22.80 25.71 45.16 30.40
Avg. studio proﬁt (Mil.) 0.72 0.84 0.57 0.91
Avg. retailer proﬁt (Mil.) 0.61 0.61 0.28 0.24
% studio proﬁt — 16.91 32.57 7.53
% retailer proﬁt — 0.19 54.91 60.71
% consumer surplus — — 7.21 9.18
Retail and studio proﬁts are weighted to include all outlets.
“Current” uses actual  and .
“Other” uses counterfactual  and .
“Mkt. Seg.” uses r and  from rental pricing; s from sell-through.
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indicate a reasonably good ﬁt to the data. Subsequent compari-
sons will be to the results in column (2).
Column (3) gives predicted market shares and proﬁts under
the “other” pricing regime. For Panel A, which contains rental
priced movies, this corresponds to the adoption of sell-through
pricing. I again solve for the optimal wholesale price. Markups
and inventory use are modeled as described in the previous sec-
tion. At these parameter values, the use of sell-through pricing
results in a roughly 15 percent reduction in proﬁts on average for
the studio. Retailers would be 10 percent better off under this
pricing regime, and consumers would be worse off under this
scenario, with consumer surplus falling roughly 21 percent. In
Panel B, the third column corresponds to counterfactual out-
comes under rental pricing. Both studios and retailers are worse
off under rental pricing for this set of titles. This is consistent
with reports in industry trade journals and interviews about the
expected effects of rental pricing for such movies. Consumers are
also worse off.
Note the effects of rental pricing strategies to limit the size of
the used market. Studios receive no revenues from these sales
and price new tapes to shrink the supply of used tapes under the
rental pricing strategy. The shrinking of this market also occurs
because video stores are assumed to use inventories more inten-
sively under rental pricing, thus carrying smaller inventories
that can subsequently be resold.
Unlike the U. S. system, copyright laws in many other countries
(most notably, the European Union and Australia) permit copyright
holders to control subsequent use of a copyrighted good. This has led
ﬁrms to adopt direct price discrimination in these markets. Column
(4) gives results under market segmentation, similar to the pricing
policies observed in countries with E.U.-type copyright laws. Under
this regime, ﬁrms charge different prices to retailers and consumers
on the ﬁrst day of a movie’s video release, but I assume they do not
engage in intertemporal price discrimination.
39 I adopt parameter
values of r and  that are appropriate to rental pricing in this
exercise. I estimate that market segmentation makes ﬁrms worse off
compared to rental pricing for movies in the upper panel. Consumer
surplus decreases by 18 percent. The lower panel shows a positive
39. The assumption of no intertemporal price discrimination follows the
actual current practice of ﬁrms in these markets.
1341 PRICE DISCRIMINATION, COPYRIGHT LAW, AND INNOVATIONeffect for studios under E.U.-type pricing, although retailers receive
lower proﬁts than they would have under rental-pricing, and con-
sumers are worse off.
Table VI provides the same results for the DVD format. The
comparison between the ﬁrst two columns indicates a good ﬁt of
the model. Results of the experiment of adopting rental pricing
for DVDs are shown in column (3). Studios and retailers are
estimated to be worse off under rental pricing for both groups of
titles as are consumers. Column (4) considers direct price discrim-
ination (market segmentation). Studios are estimated to increase
their proﬁts by about 6–8 percent under this pricing regime
compared to the sell-through pricing strategy used currently in
the United States. Consumers also beneﬁt signiﬁcantly under
this policy. On the other hand, the use of market segmentation is
estimated to make retailers worse off.
40
Comparisons of “current” versus “other” results for Tables V
and VI provide average results across titles and indicate that
ﬁrms’ pricing choices are consistent with what my model predicts
to be the correct choice, on average. Examining ﬁrms’ decisions
for individual titles (not reported separately) shows that my
model predicts the same marketing scheme as that chosen for
thirty-ﬁve of the forty-one movies on the VHS format and for
thirty-two of the forty-one movies on the DVD format. The esti-
mated difference in proﬁts across the two pricing regimes ranges
from close to zero (there are nine movies where the predicted
difference is less than 3 percent) to one movie with a 99 percent
predicted difference. For the vast majority of titles, the predicted
difference in proﬁts is between 20 and 40 percent. There are not
obvious differences by genre or rating classiﬁcation in what the
model predicts to be optimal, compared to actual choices.
One could also examine the outcomes among current VHS
participants under the assumption that everyone in the VHS
market eventually adopts DVD technology by replacing the prod-
uct quality parameters for each title-use pair under the VHS
format with the quality parameters for the same title-use appro-
priate to the DVD format. Although not reported here, this exer-
40. Anecdotally, the average predicted prices under this scenario ($43 for
retailers and $24 for consumers for the set of sell-through priced titles) are close
to some actual prices charged for recent sell-through priced DVD releases in the
United Kingdom. For example, Garﬁeld—The Movie, with U. S. theatrical box-
ofﬁce receipts of $75 million, was released in the United Kingdom recently at
prices of £15.99 and £11.99, or $30.74 and $23.05, for retailers and individuals,
respectively.
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rental pricing becomes a more proﬁtable strategy compared to
sell-through pricing. Despite the higher relative estimated qual-
ity of the DVD technology for owning, the population that was
using VHS technology in 2000 and 2001 differs from their DVD
counterparts in the overall utility that it receives from watching
movies (the ’s). As a result, studio proﬁts are estimated to be
higher under a rental pricing strategy for the group of titles that
were rental priced on VHS (but lower under a rental pricing
strategy for titles that were sell-through priced on VHS).
41
VII. CONCLUSION
Firms respond strategically to the legal restrictions imposed
upon them and the technologies they face. As a result, giving
additional control to a copyright holder may affect pricing strat-
egies, which may impact consumer surplus as well as producer
surplus for ﬁrms that use copyrighted goods as inputs (e.g., re-
tailers). To identify factors inﬂuencing ﬁrms’ optimal responses to
U. S. copyright law, I empirically examine the outcomes of two
pricing strategies used by ﬁrms for products that are identical in
content but distributed via an old established technology and a
new emerging technology. I show that the decision to price dis-
criminate depends on the expected costs and beneﬁts of doing so,
and I provide empirical evidence that ﬁrms account for the costs
and beneﬁts of indirect price discrimination when choosing their
optimal pricing strategies. Speciﬁcally, both demographic effects
and product quality levels differ across the VHS and DVD for-
mats and contribute to the different pricing strategies chosen for
these two formats. However, the most important difference for
explaining ﬁrms’ pricing decisions seems to be the relative value
of owning a movie, which varies by movie and also by format.
I examine the welfare effects of the current price discrimina-
tion strategies used by ﬁrms in the United States and ﬁnd that
indirect price discrimination beneﬁts copyright holders but gen-
erally harms retailers. Consumer welfare is highest under the
current price discrimination strategies in use; thus, for some
titles, indirect price discrimination beneﬁts consumers, while for
other titles, consumers are made worse off by this form of price
discrimination. I also estimate the welfare effects of an alterna-
41. For details, see the working paper version of this paper from June 2006.
1343 PRICE DISCRIMINATION, COPYRIGHT LAW, AND INNOVATIONtive form of copyright protection that would allow for direct price
discrimination, and I ﬁnd that price discrimination under this
law tends to beneﬁt copyright holders and consumers at the
expense of retailers.
Future research could examine the effects of indirect price
discrimination when used in conjunction with revenue-sharing
contracts. Such contracts were widely used for rental priced mov-
ies on the VHS format in the late 1990s, and could affect social
welfare in the future if indirect price discrimination were adopted
for DVDs. By reducing some of the inefﬁciencies of indirect price
discrimination, revenue sharing may help to mitigate welfare
losses due to copyright restrictions and would make indirect price
discrimination even more attractive.
DATA APPENDIX
The auxiliary data sources outlined in Section III are used to
deﬁne market size based on geographic size, format use, and
outlet market share (to weight the observations from video rental
stores). Geographic market size is based on zip codes. Clearly, zip
code areas are designed to provide convenient local areas for the
purposes of delivering mail, rather than as deﬁnitions of local
markets. However, zip code areas appear to be a reasonable
demarcation between markets in this setting: the average zip
code area contains approximately 24,000 people and 2.6 video
retail stores. Larger areas, such as four-digit zip code areas or
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) are also feasible ways of
attaching local demographic and business listing information but
seem to cover too large a geographic area for most video store
customers.
For format use, I use Centris data on DVD hardware pene-
tration. Centris surveys consumers each month on whether or not
they own a DVD console and weights each consumer survey
response according to a demographic weighting scheme.
42 The
Centris data begin their coverage in the late 1990s and continue
through June 2001. I aggregate the individual surveys in each
state to calculate an implied state-level DVD hardware penetra-
tion rate. Due to the limitations of the survey size in each month
and the noisiness of the weighting scheme, I then ﬁt a linear
trend in each state across the eighteen months of January 2000
42. Karaca-Mandic [2003] provides more detail on the Centris data.
1344 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSthrough June 2001. I use these ﬁtted penetration rates in each
month in each state as the actual penetration rates, and I assume
that they are uniform within a state during that month.
43
I denote Nm,q
VHS and Nm,q
DVD as the number of consumers in
market m and month t that rent and purchase movies on VHS
and DVD formats, respectively. The estimates of Nm,t
VHS and Nm,t
DVD
in each market are
(8)
Nm,t
VHS  HH  0.90  DVDt/STORESm,y and
Nm,t
DVD[HHDVDt]/STORESm,y,
where 0.90 is the national penetration of VCRs, assumed to be
constant across markets, the variable HH is the number of house-
holds in the zip code from the 2000 U. S. Census, and the variable
DVDq is the penetration rate of DVD hardware in the relevant
state and month.
44 The variable STORESm,y is the number of
video specialty stores listed in the phone book for that zip code in
year y. I observe roughly one of three stores in each zip code
neighborhood. Unfortunately, I do not observe rentals and sales
at other stores. Dividing N by the number of stores in the market
inﬂates my observed sales and rentals at a single store to be
representative of the local zip code area under the assumption
that the unobserved stores have the same characteristics and
sales as the observed store and that phone book listings represent
the total population of video specialty stores.
The market for purchasing VHS tapes and DVDs also includes
used tapes from stores’ rental inventories. Unfortunately, the pri-
mary data source does not record sales transactions separately as
used or new. The best deﬁnition I have for distinguishing between
new and used products is on the basis of price. I estimate wholesale
price as being equal to 60 percent of the suggested retail price. This
estimate is also borne out by industry interviews. Thus, I classify a
sale as “used” if the average weekly price of sales for a title at a store
is below the wholesale price of a new tape. This classiﬁcation iden-
tiﬁes approximately 80–85 percent of all sales at my observed video
specialty stores as used. I checked these estimates with profession-
als in the industry and with more detailed tabulations of the phone-
43. One would, of course, like to have even more detailed information on
these penetration rates, but these are the best data available, to my knowledge.
44. I match up titles to the monthly state penetration ﬁgures based on the
month in which a title was released. The ﬁgure for overall VCR penetration (0.90)
is from the VSDA 2002 Annual Report.
1345 PRICE DISCRIMINATION, COPYRIGHT LAW, AND INNOVATIONsurvey data in Table VII. For purposes of weighting the sales and
rental observations, I assume that all sales of used tapes occur
through video specialty stores (and not, for example, through mass-
merchandisers like Walmart).
To weight the observed rentals and sales according to the
market share of the stores in my database, I use an auxiliary
dataset on phone survey data that asks respondents for informa-
tion on where they purchased and rented videos. Table VII out-
lines market shares of rentals and purchases according to the
type of retail outlet where rentals and purchases occurred.
45
Rentrak’s data cover the population in the ﬁrst row of Table VII,
“video specialty retailers,” and I make use of the data in the other
rows of Table VII to weight my estimated market shares. As
shown in Table VII, video specialty retailers represent nearly 77
and 74 percent of all VHS and DVD rentals, respectively. How-
ever, a greater proportion of sales occur through alternative dis-
tribution channels, including internet and nonspecialized retail
outlets, and so it is important to weight the sample accordingly.
I assume that purchases from discount merchandisers and in-
ternet ﬁrms, etc., occur with equal probability across zip code areas
and that used tapes are only sold by video specialty stores. The
45. The table is constructed from data gathered on consumers’ purchase and
rental habits by Alexander and Associates, and reﬂects market shares as of the
spring of 2002.
TABLE VII
MARKET SHARES OF ALTERNATIVE DISTRIBUTION CHANNELS:R ENTALS AND SALES
Retail outlet
VHS
rental
VHS
sales
DVD
rental
DVD
sales
Video specialty (percent) 76.8 22.9 73.8 10.0
a
Other brick and mortar/grocery
stores, etc. 23.2 10.7 17.1 30.0
b
Internet (Netﬂix, etc.) 0 1.9 9.1 10.0
Discount merchandiser (i.e.,
Walmart, etc.) 0 55.1 0 40.0
c
Other (direct mail, etc.) 0 9.4 0 10.0
Data Source: Alexander and Associates. Sales tabulations reﬂect activity for the second quarter of 2002;
rental tabulations reﬂect activity for May 2002.
a. Includes Blockbuster at 7 percent (mostly previewed DVDs) and an allowance for other video specialty
stores.
b. Includes Best Buy at 20 percent, Circuit City at 5 percent, and an allowance for others at 5 percent.
c. Includes Walmart at 29 percent, Target at 8 percent, and an allowance for others at 3 percent.
1346 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSphone survey data include both used and new sales. Thus, the
weight in Table VII gives the weight to be applied for all sales (used
plus new). To get the correct weight for new sales, I calculate the
total number of weighted sales, subtract used sales, and calculate
the appropriate weight for new sales. I do this for each store-title
pair on each format, using format-speciﬁc weights from Table VII.
Now I can write down the relevant market size for each store-
format-product as
(9)
Nr,m,t
VHS  0.768  Nm,t
VHS,
Nu,m,t
VHS  Nm,t
VHS,
Ns,m,t
VHS  WVHS  Nm,t
VHS,
Nr,m,t
DVD  0.738  Nm,t
DVD,
Nu,m,t
DVD  Nm,t
DVD, and
Ns,m,t
DVD  WDVD  Nm,t
DVD,
where WVHS and WDVD are vectors of new sales weights for each
store-title pair on VHS and DVD formats, respectively. This def-
inition of market size effectively weights the sample of stores
appropriately to reﬂect the national market.
46 It would be won-
derful to have data on new sales from other outlets, such as
mass-merchandisers. Unfortunately, I do not observe title iden-
tity, so collecting and matching such data is not possible.
Table VIII shows total activity levels in the data as well as
weighted totals. Most of the sales that occur in this population of
stores are sales of used tapes. The weights applied to new sales
are much larger, as I discuss in the estimation section. The ratio
of total weighted sales to total weighted rentals across the four
quadrants shows a higher overall level of weighted sales for
DVDs compared to VHSs: 29.9 and 34.5 percent of rentals for
DVDs versus 13.2 and 7.5 percent of rentals for the same titles on
VHS format. Note that by comparing the different titles on the
DVD format, one should get a sense of the importance of the
endogeneity of the sell-through pricing decision. DVDs are priced
the same for all titles, so the extent to which sell-through
priced titles sell better on DVD than rental priced titles should be
due to unobservable characteristics of the titles that make them
46. I have also estimated the model assuming that sell-through priced VHS
titles have the same representation across video stores and mass merchandisers
as DVDs. This does not change the results in any meaningful way.
1347 PRICE DISCRIMINATION, COPYRIGHT LAW, AND INNOVATIONrelatively more desirable to own. This difference in the ratio of
sales to rentals for these sets of titles is 4.6 percent for DVDs (34.5
versus 29.9 percent). Overall levels of DVD activity (including
rentals) are higher for sell-through priced titles, but overall levels
of VHS activity are higher for rental priced titles.
Titles sell less often on the VHS format. This presumably
reﬂects a relatively higher quality attached to owning DVDs
compared to VHS tapes, perhaps because of the increased dura-
bility or ﬂexibility for playing the DVDs on laptops, etc. It could
also reﬂect differences in taste for quality across the population of
consumers adopting DVD versus VHS. The difference between
rental priced titles and sell-through priced titles on the VHS
format reﬂects both unobservable differences in the desirability of
owning that lead to a sell-through or rental pricing decision, as
well as the effect of delaying sales of the rental priced titles. The
difference here is quite large: sales total 13.2 percent of rentals
for sell-through priced titles, compared to 7.5 percent of rentals
for rental priced titles. The difference is due to both lower levels
of rentals as well as higher levels of sales.
HARVARD UNIVERSITY AND NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
TABLE VIII
WEIGHTED QUANTITIES OF RENTALS AND SALES
VHS DVD
Rentals
Used
sales
New
sales Rentals
Used
sales
New
sales
Panel A: Rental priced titles (N  12):
Total per title (’000) 1,112.2 20.3 0.2 129.6 3.7 1.5
Weighted total per title 4,054.9 56.8 248.5 491.7 10.4 136.6
Ratio, weighted sales/
rentals (percent) 7.5 29.9
Panel B: Sell-through priced titles (N  29):
Total per title (’000) 910.5 39.2 0.5 131.8 5.0 0.9
Weighted total per title 3,319.5 109.8 327.3 500.1 14.0 158.4
Ratio, weighted sales/
rentals (percent) 13.2 34.5
Tabulations compiled by author using data from Rentrak Corporation and Alexander and Associates for
the forty-one titles used in the analysis, which were released between January 2000 and December 2001.
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